



Quest for missing keytags

Roy Arends | DNS-OARC | 1 April 2016

Pubquiz question:

What is a DNSKEY Key Tag

- A. a 16 bit value in the DNSKEY RDATA
- B. a physical tag that you'd hang on your key ring
- C. a 16 bit value in the DS and RRSIG RDATA
- D. a special variation of the game of tag.

Why did I look into this?

2010, first root KSK published,
2015, I started working on my testbed

Why did I look into this?

2010

2015

Why did I look into this?

2010

2015

I wanted to use those as keytags for my testbed.

You can't simply assign a keytag to a dnskey.

RFC4034:

“the algorithm for calculating the Key Tag is almost but not completely identical to the familiar ones-complement checksum used in many other Internet protocols.”

Simple loop

```
while true
do dnssec-keygen -a RSASHA256 -f KSK -b 2048 .
done
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while true
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This only generated about 16K keys

I was expecting 64K keys

keytags 02010 and 02015 were absent

Simple loop

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while true
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```

First clue by Duane Wessels:

dnssec-keygen won't generate a new key if:

- the new key tag conflicts with an existing key tag + revoke bit
- the new key tag + revoke bit conflicts with an existing key tag

Nice! Well observed.

Less Simple loop

```
while true
do dnssec-keygen -a RSASHA256 -f KSK -b 2048 .\
  >> taglist
  rm K\.+008*;
done
```

This simply removes keys after they're created, but adds the tag to a list.

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sort -u taglist | wc -l
16387
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```
sort -u taglist | wc -l
16387
```

Wait, what? Not 16384?

It's the tool, try a different one.

```
while true
do ldns-keygen -a RSASHA256 -k -b 2048 .
done
```

Nice and simple. No undocumented features.

Allows for foot shooting.

It's the tool, try a different one.

```
while true
do ldns-keygen -a RSASHA256 -k -b 2048 .
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```
ls K.*private | wc -l
16385
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```
ls K.*private | wc -l
16385
```

Still, not high enough.

Meanwhile, via Twitter



Peter van Dijk
@Habбие



Following

@royarends just as a data point I now have a collection of 2048bit RSASHA256 keys with 17896 distinct keytags. Still generating more keys :)

LIKES

2



1:14 PM - 30 Nov 2015



Meanwhile, via Twitter



Peter van Dijk

@Habbie



Following

@royarends the tool is 'pdnssec add-zone-key' using mbedTLS 2.1.0 (formerly known as Polar). Flags all 257. I'll check the exponents.

1:45 PM - 30 Nov 2015



So, it could be the library

DNSSEC-Keygen and Idns-keygen use OpenSSL

pdnssec uses mbedTLS

Is this a bug in OpenSSL?

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Is this a bug in OpenSSL?

“KEYSTARVE” [goes and registers name]

But.... On DNS-Operations

Peter van Dijk:

I now have ~130k (different!) keys, with 32201 unique key tags. This is almost twice as much as Roy had but it looks like it might top off around 32k.

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Peter van Dijk

@Habbie

Dec 02

@royarends @KeesMonshouwer

@PowerDNS_Bert @vavrusam @X_Cli I now
have 32769 (yes, 9) keytags.

Now what...

Three different tools

Two different libraries

Three issues:

- 1) Not enough keytags (expected 64K, got less)
- 2) Off by a few keytags (16387, 16385, 32769)
- 3) One library produces 50% of the other library

Is it the keytag function?

The keytag function is very similar to a radix minus one complement function. Very similar to the Internet Header Checksum.

So, generate 2048 random bits in pairs of 2 byte words and do an Internet Header Checksum over that.

```
while true
do jot -r 128 0 65535 | awk \
  '{s+=$1} END {print (s + int(s/65536))%65535}' \
  >>test
done
```

```
sort -u test | wc -l
65536
```

It is not the keytag function

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- It is not the library
- It is not the tools

(and hopefully not the user)



The Internet Header Checksum is equivalent to
addition modulo 65535

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Assuming a 32 bit number ($\$num$) this means:

$$(\$num \text{ AND } 65535) + (\$num \gg 16)$$

is equivalent to

$$\$num \% 65535$$

`$num % 65535`

In our case, `$num` contains the RDATA of the DNSKEY.

For all the keys generated, the RDATA part contains a constant:

`(RDLENGTH,PROTOCOL,ALGORITHM, EXPONENT)`

And a variable part:

The RSA modulus, which consist of two prime factors P and Q

Therefore, we have

$$\text{\$num} \% 65535$$

Is equivalent to:

$$(\text{constant} + P*Q) \% 65535$$

Is equivalent to:

$$(\text{constant} \% 65535) + ((P*Q) \% 65535)$$

Ignoring the constant part we have:

$$(P*Q) \% 65535$$

We know that P and Q are very large primes.

65535 has factors: 3, 5, 17, 257

Since (P, Q, 3, 5, 17 and 257) are co-prime,

P, Q can't be divided by 3, 5, 17 and 257

and

$$(P*Q) \% 3, 5, 17 \text{ or } 257 \text{ will never be } 0$$

Florian Maury and Jérôme Plût

$(P*Q) \% 3, 5, 17 \text{ or } 257$ will never be 0

$(P*Q) \% 3$ has 2 solutions (not 3)

$(P*Q) \% 5$ has 4 solutions (not 5)

$(P*Q) \% 17$ has 16 solutions (not 17) and

$(P*Q) \% 257$ has 256 solutions (not 257)

So, $(P*Q) \% 65535$ has $2*4*16*256$ solutions

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So, $(P*Q) \% 65535$ has $2*4*16*256$ solutions, or

32768 different keytags

Hoorah!

Three issues, one solved:

- 1) SOLVED: Not enough keytags (expected 64K, got less)
- 2) Off by a few keytags (16387, 16385, 32769)
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Off by a few

Very similar is not exactly the same

The last part of the key-tag function in RFC4034 reads as follows:

```
ac += (ac >> 16) & 0xFFFF;  
return ac & 0xFFFF;
```

If the previous line result in a carry (value > 65535), the latter line ignores it.

Hence, some off by a few keytags are a result of that.

Hoorah!

Three issues, two solved:

- 1) SOLVED: Not enough keytags (expected 64K, got less)
- 2) SOLVED: Off by a few keytags (16387, 16385, 32769)
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Half the key space

Peter, using mbedTLS was able to produce twice as many keytags.

OpenSSL only generates safe primes:

$P = 2 * P' + 1$ where P' is also prime.

That implies that $P \bmod 3$ is never 1 (and thus always 2)

So: $P * Q = M$

$(P \bmod 3) * (Q \bmod 3) = M \bmod 3$

$2 * 2 = 4 \bmod 3$

$M \bmod 3$ is 1. Always

Half the keyspace

$(P*Q) \% 3, 5, 17 \text{ or } 257$ will never be 0

$(P*Q) \% 3$ has 2 solutions (not 3)

$(P*Q) \% 5$ has 4 solutions (not 5)

$(P*Q) \% 17$ has 16 solutions (not 17) and

$(P*Q) \% 257$ has 256 solutions (not 257)

So, $(P*Q) \% 65535$ has $2*4*16*256$ solutions, or

32768 different keytags

Half the keyspace

$(P*Q) \% 3, 5, 17 \text{ or } 257$ will never be 0

$(P*Q) \% 3$ will always be 1

$(P*Q) \% 3$ has **1** solution (not 3)

$(P*Q) \% 5$ has 4 solutions (not 5)

$(P*Q) \% 17$ has 16 solutions (not 17) and

$(P*Q) \% 257$ has 256 solutions (not 257)

So, $(P*Q) \% 65535$ has **1*4*16*256** solutions, or

~~32768~~ different keytags

16384

Hoorah!

Three issues, two solved:

- 1) SOLVED: Not enough keytags (expected 64K, got less)
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Thanks to

Warren Kumari

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Jean-René Reinhard

Peter van Dijk

Bert Hubert

David Conrad

And all who have participated in the discussions on dns-operations

Questions?