

# RPKI Ecosystem Measurement


IEPG

2023.03.26


Romain Fontugne, Amreesh Phokeer, Cristel Pelsser, Kevin Vermeulen, & Randy Bush







The Money is Here ©



## The Experiment(s)

#### Prefixes

- Each of the Five RIRs loaned us a few IPv4 /24s and IPv6 /48s
- Prefixes were announced from one AS with ROV upstreams and some direct IX peers which were non-ROV
- Another set of RIPE prefixes from 3

   ASs fed by non-ROV upstreams
- Measurements taken over eleven months

#### ROA Beacons

- Used API or GUI at each RIR to Create and Delete ROAs
- Control /24s and /48s have non-varying 'good' ROAs, always Valid
- Test /24 and /48 always have an Invalidating ROA
- But Announced a Validating ROA once per day for half a day

## ROA Creation Delay (min)

	Sign*	NotBefore*	Publication†	Relying Party†	BGP‡
AFRINIC	0 (0)	0 (0)	3 (2)	14 (13)	15 (16)
APNIC	10 (13)	10 (13)	14 (16)	34 (38)	26(28)
ARIN	- (-)	- (-)	69 (97)	81 (109)	95 (143)
LACNIC	0 (0)	- (-)	54 (32)	66 (42)	51 (34)
RIPE	0 (0)	0 (0)	4 (4)	14 (13)	18 (18)
After fix:				50 50 50	1.3 538 504
ARIN	- (-)	- (-)	8 (9)	21 (22)	28 (23)

- ARIN and LacNIC were signing in GMT (HSM)
  - But publishing in Local Time
  - So, NotBefore appeared to be hours before publication
  - · We reported, they hacked a work-around
- APNIC always waited for 20 minute batches

## ROA Creation Delay

- Creation times vary significantly across RIRs, with medians ranging from a few minutes to over an hour for new ROAs to reach the publication points
- And we know of at least one NIR (not RIR) that only publishes once per day!

## Measurement Relying Party

- One instance of RP software
- See Philip Smith's measurements on how RPs vary <sup>(3)</sup>
- Did not run RPKI-Rtr, because we were more interested in effect on BGP
- Some RPs have not discovered fork() and exec(), so HeadOfLineBlock trying to fetch from bad Publication Points


#### RIPE/RIS Collectors


- Recorded Control and Test at RIPE/RIS
- If Control missing, that measurement is discarded
- · This measures control plane, BGP, effect
- Used two collectors, RRC00 and RRC01.
   Studies have shown that's enough
- Has all the biases discussed for years

### ROA Revoke Delay (min)

	Revocation*	Relying Party†	BGP‡
AFRINIC	0 (0)	13 (14)	34 (38)
APNIC	10 (12)	31 (36)	51 (56)
ARIN	0 (0)	14 (16)	45 (51)
LACNIC	0 (0)	18 (20)	48 (49)
RIPE	0 (0)	14 (13)	41 (50)


Additional APNIC delay possibly due to RP hanging Plus APNIC has that 20 minute batching delay







#### Withdraws are Slower

- Because <u>all</u> of the router's / A5's
   RP caches must have received the
   Withdraw from the PPs
- ROV only needs one Validating ROA
- So only one cache needs to have a ROA for the router to Validate



Sprint's slower curve because RPs pull less frequently than NTT's, &/or sucky RP software Sprint starts a bit earlier because routers poll RP caches more frequently than NTT's Confirmed with Sprint and NTT







#### Data Plane Measurement

- Ran traceroute from Atlas Probes
- To the Test prefixes
- Every 15 minutes
- Result pretty much the same as BGP at RIPE/RIS, but
- Path hunting after a Withdraw is graphically obvious

## Data Plane & Path Hunting






## And ISP Delay Looks Bigger

	Sign*	NotBefore*	Publication†	Relying Party†	BGP‡
AFRINIC	0 (0)	0 (0)	3(2)	14 (13)	15 (16)
APNIC	10 (13)	10 (13)	14 (16)	34 (38)	26(28)
ARIN	- (-)	- (-)	69 (97)	81 (109)	95 (143)
LACNIC	0 (0)	- (-)	54 (32)	66 (42)	51 (34)
RIPE	0 (0)	0 (0)	$\bigcirc 4$ (4)	14 (13)	18 (18)
After fix:	50 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000				1.1 OH 00-
ARIN	- (-)	- (-)	8 (9)	21 (22)	28 (23)

Let's assume ARIN and LacNIC TimeZone anomalies are fixed



#### Problems

- BGP propagates in minutes. RPKI propagates in O(hour). This has business impacts, e.g.
  - Time to Repair for a bad ROA
  - Time to authorize a DDoS mitigator
- Two RIRs with HSM in GMT and CAs in Local Time Zone. Reported and 'fixed'
- Some RPs have not discovered fork() and exec()
- ROA Anatomy varies between RIRs

## Limitations of Study

- Relying Party software:
  - Fixed fetch rate so poor resolution
  - Only one RP software package used
- Did not measure RP to Router. But that is Notify driven so should be fast
- Did not measure delegated CAs
- RIR API/Screen-Scrape unreliable

#### What We Can Do?

- · CAs/RIRs Publish Very Frequently
- RPs Poll Frequently, RRDP Please

#### As Protocol Designers

- BGP Transport is
  - Dangerously Shared Fate
  - Unordered, Reordering Guaranteed
- DNS does not handle Make Before Break

## Is this Improving?

# We Do Not Measure Our Networks Well ®

## Make Friends with a Measurement Researcher



#### From the Paper in PAM 2023

## RPKI Time-of-Flight: Tracking Delays in the Management, Control, and Data Planes

Romain Fontugne<sup>1</sup>, Amreesh Phokeer<sup>2</sup>, Cristel Pelsser<sup>3</sup>, Kevin Vermeulen<sup>4</sup>, and Randy Bush<sup>1,5</sup>

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**Abstract.** As RPKI is becoming part of ISPs' daily operations and Route Origin Validation is getting widely deployed, one wonders how long it takes for the effect of RPKI changes to appear in the data plane.

https://archive.psg.com/pam2023-rov-ecosystem.pdf

#### Thanks To

Arrcus Cisco Equinix Google Juniper NTT Sprint

#### For Donated

- Rack Space
- Bandwidth
- Routers
- Switches
- Servers
- Etc. Etc.

## Questions?

## And Position Statements Pretending to be Questions ©